

VZCZCXRO4881

PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHIK RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #0374/01 1342239

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 142239Z MAY 07

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1870
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1297
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1075
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1031
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0152
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0835
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0352
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0716
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0220
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0282
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0734
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0869

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000374

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO YI UNMIK

SUBJECT: IN MEETING WITH P3 SYG BAN STILL CAUTIOUS ON
DARFUR ACTION

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00368

USUN NEW Y 00000374 001.2 OF 003

¶11. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a May 11 meeting with Permanent Three Security Council Members, United Nations Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon seemed defensive about his emphasis on the political process as the appropriate way to proceed on Darfur. While SYG Ban agreed joint and/or individual pressure on Khartoum might be necessary to spark Darfur progress, he would not commit to dates for coordinated demarches with the P5 (reftel) to apply such pressure. He did, however, stress the need for P3 assistance to secure Sudanese cooperation on land acquisition and water drilling rights for camp construction in Darfur under the Heavy Support Package (HSP), as well as to drum up African HSP troop commitments. Ban reiterated his stance that imposition of sanctions would not be as strategically effective with the Sudanese Government as the mere threat of them. Ban said candidates, including European candidates, were being interviewed for Special Representative for the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Ban sought P5 assistance with normalizing relations between Chad and Sudan and with convincing Chadian President Deby on the need for a UN peacekeeping presence in eastern Chad. French Permanent Representative (PR) de La Sabliere pushed for SYG intervention with Russian FM Lavrov and/or President Putin to convince Moscow to endorse the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo. The SYG raised Lebanon, to be reported septel. Finally, the SYG requested P3 support for the process of restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). END SUMMARY.

BAN UPDATES ON MODEST DARFUR PROGRESS

¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad, UK PR Jones Parry and French PR de La Sabliere all expressed appreciation for the SYG's efforts on Darfur but expressed their shared concern that

progress on the political, security and humanitarian fronts needed to be accelerated, offering their assistance to increase momentum. Updating the P3 on the political process, Ban reported that Special Envoy Eliasson would be in New York May 17-18 to discuss his "roadmap" on Darfur political reconciliation, which, according to Eliasson's staff, outlined preparations for negotiations between the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) and rebels; Eliasson is expected to brief the SC on this timeline in early June. According to DPKO Assistant-SYG Annabi, Eliasson sought to consolidate regional diplomatic initiatives, including those of Egypt, Eritrea, Libya and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, whose plans to host a conference in Juba of non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement were supported by the GNU. Ban wanted to emphasize the political process to avoid creating a "negative" situation on the ground in Darfur, which could lead to further instability. He reiterated his stance that imposition of sanctions would not be as strategically effective with the GNU as the mere threat of them. Ban made a point of defending his request for political space on Darfur, refuting the "negative perception" that in doing so, he showed himself sympathetic to the GNU.

¶13. (SBU) On the hybrid, Ban said the AU had reverted to the UN on May 9 with "numerous comments" to the UN draft hybrid plan, amendments nevertheless deemed "workable" by DPKO Under-SYG Guehenno and currently under consideration by DPKO technical experts. Ban expected the hybrid details to be finalized with AU by May 18, after which they would be presented to the UNSC and discussed under the Tripartite Mechanism with the GNU. Ban assured that hybrid command and control would be based on standard UN principles and practices. The Joint Special Representative (JSR) and Deputy JSR appointments were intended to be a package; although Khartoum had endorsed Mr. Rodolphe Adada as JSR, it had yet to say yes to MAJ GEN Henry Anyidoho as Deputy, but the SYG

USUN NEW Y 00000374 002.2 OF 003

did not expect opposition. Annabi explained that since the appointment of hybrid Force Commander (FC) and Deputy FC were to be made by the AU, only the AU could announce them, an announcement delayed by AU Commission Chairperson Konare's indecision on the Rwandan Deputy FC candidate but expected in the coming days. The hybrid FC, GEN Agwai, would be in New York May 16 after a May 14 stop in Addis Ababa before assuming his duties in Darfur on June 1.

HOW THE P3 COULD HELP

¶14. (SBU) Ban appealed for P3 assistance to secure Sudanese cooperation on land acquisition and water drilling rights for camp construction in Darfur under the HSP, as well as to drum up African HSP troop commitments. He noted that there were currently only two viable African TCCs (Egypt and Nigeria), not enough to stave off GNU attempts to get the UN to put off final TCC decisions until more African commitments were made. Ban noted that P3 pressure might be needed while the GNU deliberated on the UN-AU hybrid plan but vowed to expedite the GNU acceptance process as much as possible through "face-to-face" contact so as to avoid a repeat of the two months Khartoum took to endorse the HSP. Acknowledging the SYG's request that any P5 outreach on Darfur take into account parallel UN efforts, P3 Ambassadors agreed that individual or joint demarches calling for action on key benchmarks along a timeline would be coordinated with the SYG.

STILL NO NAMES FOR SRSG

¶15. (SBU) UK PR Jones Parry pressed Ban on the need to name a replacement for UNMIS SRSG. Ban reported that there were "European" candidates on the shortlist being considered and that interviews were being conducted. He mentioned the possibility that "an experienced European negotiator" would be appointed to a non-permanent position as political advisor

to Adada as a follow-on to Eliasson's role.

P3 IMPATIENCE ON CHAD

16. (SBU) All P3 Ambassadors stressed the need for a UN mission to deploy to N'Djamena to follow up with President Deby on plans for securing the refugee camps in eastern Chad.

Ban and Annabi confirmed that this mission would be dispatched in the near future, and Ban sought P5 assistance with convincing a reticent Deby on the modalities of UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad and with normalizing relations between Chad and Sudan in the face of Libyan indignation. UK PR Jones Parry pushed the SYG to commit to a date for the mission to Chad to depart, but the SYG resisted.

FRENCH SOUGHT SYG INTERVENTION WITH RUSSIA ON KOSOVO

17. (SBU) French PR de La Sabliere told the SYG there was a "clear majority" among UNSC Members in support of the Ahtisaari plan, with the only wild card being Russia. De La Sabliere emphasized the need to engage with the Russians, both in New York and in capitals, to convince them there was no alternative to the Ahtisaari plan, with the upcoming G-8 and EU-Russia Summits as good opportunities to send this message. The SYG took note of de La Sabliere's suggestion that he speak with Russian President Putin and/or FM Lavrov on this point.

SYG SOUGHT P3 INDULGENCE ON DPKO RESTRUCTURING

18. (SBU) The SYG urged P3 consideration of his plan to restructure DPKO, given that "time was of the essence" to present the plan to the Fifth Committee and the ACABQ by May 126. He stressed that this restructuring was necessary to

USUN NEW Y 00000374 003.2 OF 003

preserve DPKO integrity and was "resource-free" but would require a \$65 million increase over a two-month period in FY 2007-2008 to keep up with the surge in peacekeeping demands. Ambassador Khalilzad and UK PR Jones Parry requested clarity on the number and duration of new appointments, and UK PR Jones Parry cautioned that unless DPKO and the SYG undertook intensive lobbying efforts in support of the plan, it would not get through Fifth Committee.

KHALILZAD